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Abstract
We investigate the strategic relationship between a foreign firm
and a local firm in an international joint venture (IJV). We develop
a simple partial equilibrium model in which a local firm invests in
skills, which affects the productivity of the IJV, and the foreign firm
decides whether to implement an IJV or not. In equilibrium, foreign
ownership is a key factor that determines the investment level and the
foreign firm’s strategy. If foreign ownership is too low or too high,
the foreign firm cannot induce the local partner to invest in skills, a
situation that provides the lowest payoff for both agents. If it is at a
medium level, the local partner invests in management skill and the
foreign firm chooses the IJV strategy. In this case, both agents receive
a higher payoff.
∗RCAST, University of Tokyo 4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904, e-mail:
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1 Introduction
As the production market is expanding, an increasing number of firms are
shifting their production to an unexplored area and to gain a larger mar-
ket share. A host country can also benefit from the entry of foreign firms,
which may become active its production market and provide benefits such as
production spillover and infrastructure building. In particular, international
joint ventures (IJVs) are common in inactive production markets or indus-
tries as the first phase of entry to local production. In some cases, foreign
firms can produce in a local market only via IJV projects due to foreign
equity caps or difficulty controlling local resources. We focus on two impor-
tant factors which influence IJV project implementation and its performance,
resource complementarity and foreign ownership.
When firms enter joint ventures, whether they perceive critical resource
complementarity or not is an important key factor (Beamish, 2008; Chung,
Singh, and Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). That is, a
foreign firm has good production technology (a technology related resource),
while a local partner has knowledge-related resources, skills in managing
a local labor force, and knowledge of marketing networks and consumers
tastes. These latter two resources have a complementary relationship. In
other words, the degree of complementarity between partners is critical for
their IJV to profit. While multinational firms prioritize the skills of a local
partner in an IJV project, a local partner or host country needs to invest in
order to attract foreign firms if an IJV project will be profitable
Foreign ownership works by allocating profit between a foreign firm and
its local partner determined by negotiation or restricted by government regu-
lation or other aspects of the production environment. It affects the strategic
behavior of agents in IJV projects as well as IJV performance. Local firm
with lower profit have no incentive to attract foreign firms if the foreign own-
ership is too large. In fact, some host countries impose foreign equity caps
by industry. Unrestricted foreign ownership promotes foreign direct invest-
ment (Contractor, 1991). We consider how foreign ownership affects overseas
strategy based on the strategic relationship between partners.
In this paper, we construct a simple partial equilibrium model in which
a local partner chooses its investment level and the foreign firm chooses its
overseas strategies to serve goods. We consider the following three stage
game. In the rst stage, the local partner chooses the investment level that
can promote the productivity and provide a share according to the foreign
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ownership. In the next stage, the firm decides whether to adopt a local
production strategy or not. If the firm chooses local production, they must
employ a local partner whose skill level determines the productivity of the
overseas subsidiary. In the third stage, firms produce goods via Cournot
competition. We show the strategic relationship between agents and derive
the skill level and firms decisions in equilibrium by solving the 3-stage game.
The equilibrium patterns depend on the degree of foreign ownership of the
IJV. When foreign ownership is too low or too high, the local partner does not
invest at all and then the foreign firm chooses to export goods. When foreign
ownership is at a middle level, the foreign firm decides to enter business with
a local partner. In this case, there are two patterns of investment for the local
partner. The local partner invests at the lowest level at which the foreign
firm will choose an IJV strategy. As foreign ownership increases, the local
partner chooses the investment level that maximizes its payoff in the IJV
case.
In terms of relationship between foreign ownership and skill investment
by the local partner, Lin and Saggi (2004) demonstrate that firm with more
productive inputs should get the majority ownership. They express skepti-
cism of policies that prohibit foreign firms from holding majority ownership
based on foreign firms IJV commitment. In our paper, we consider the case
in which the foreign firm has no commitment to its strategy. If foreign own-
ership is at a lower level, the foreign firm may not join the IJV project.
We then focus on the strategic relationship between partners and show how
foreign ownership affects the behavior of a foreign firm and its local partner.
The rest of paper is organized into four sections. In the first, we explain
the model setting. In the second, we solve the second and third stage of
the game. In third section, we solve the first stage game and characterize
the property of equilibrium and analyze comparative statistics to discuss the
economic implications. The final section concludes.
2 Model
In this section, describe the model and explain some assumptions. We use a
simple partial equilibrium model that has a local firm in host country (firm l)
and one production firm in foreign country (firm f). For simplicity, we focus
only on the market in host country. To analyze the strategic relationship
between the foreign firm and the local partner, we consider the following 3
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stage game. Consider the following sequence of events:
Stage 1: The local firm chooses investment level s to obtain the
management skill.
Stage 2: The foreign firm decides whether they serve the local
market through local production or not.
Stage 3: Production occurs.
In stage 1, the local partner incurs an investment cost to achieve skill s.
We specify the cost function for skill investment as A(s) = αs2, where α is
a cost parameter. We assume skill s to be a relation-specific skill that does
not affect the payoff of the export strategy. Assume that s decreases in the
marginal cost of production when a joint venture occurs in the next stage.
In stage 2, firm f chooses to supply produced goods in two ways: joint
venture or export. If the firm chooses the export strategy, it can produce
goods under the marginal cost of the home country, cf . If the firm chooses the
local production strategy, the firm establishes a joint venture the local partner
to produce monopolistically (an IJV project). In this case, the productivity
of the IJV project depends on the skill level of the local partner. We specify
the marginal cost function of the IJV case as decreasing in s, as follows:
c(s) = c0 − s c0 is constant.
When firm f chooses the IJV strategy, the profits are shared in the proportion
of β to 1−β. Then, in the final stage, they produce goods exclusively in the
host country.
When firm f exports goods to the host country, firm f obtains all of the
profit it earns. We assume the marginal profit to be constant, cf , which is
independent of the level of s. In this case, firm l becomes the rival firm. In
the final stage, they compete via Cournot competition.
We solve the game by backward induction. The next section begins with
an analysis of the third stage.
2.1 Production
We assume that the inverse demand function in the z case (z = JV,EX) is
linear,
P (Y z) = −aY z + b.
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Denote Y z as the aggregate output in the host country in case z. That is,
YJV = y
JV and Y EX = yEXf + y
EX
l . In the IJV case, the IJV firm can
produce as a monopoly firm. Then, we can derive the following equilibrium
quantities and joint profit:
yJV ∗ =
1
2a
[b− c(s)] (1)
RJV ∗ =
1
4a
[b− c(s)]2. (2)
In the EX case, firms produce through Cournot competition. Hence, mak-
ing same calculation as the case of local production, we obtain the following
equilibrium quantities and profits:
yEX∗f =
1
3a
[b− 2cf + cl] (3)
yEX∗l =
1
3a
[b+ cf − 2cl] (4)
REX∗f =
1
9a
[b− 2cf + cl]2 (5)
REX∗l =
1
9a
[b+ cf − 2cl]2 (6)
2.2 Second stage
Next, we analyze how firm f chooses between the IJV and EX strategy. By
comparing the profit of the local production strategy with that of the export
strategy, we can rewrite the difference in profit as
Φ(s) ≡ piJVf − piEXf =
β
4a
[b− c(s)]2 − 1
9a
[b− 2cf + cl]2
We assume Φ(c0) > 0. From s ≥ 0 and Φ(0) < 0, there exists a unique s that
satisfies Φ(s) equal to zero. This is the indifference point of profit between
both strategy cases. We denote it as s˜ and derive it as follows:
s˜ =
2
3
β−
1
2 (b− 2cf + cl)− (b− c0)
Then, we obtain the following lemma:
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Lemma 1 When the skill level is higher (lower) than s˜, the IJV (export)
strategy is adopted.
3 Equilibrium: First stage
We go back to the first stage game to derive the optimal investment level of
the local firm based on the threshold value derived in the second stage.
Given the IJV strategy, we can rewrite the local firms payoff as the fol-
lowing function with respect to s:
piJVl (s) =
1
4a
(1− β)[b− c(s)]2 − αs2. (7)
Hence, we can derive the maximal value sˆ of piJVl (s),
sˆ =
(1− β)(b− c0)
4aα− (1− β) , (8)
which satisfies the following conditions:
∂ΠJV (s)
∂s
= 0
∂2ΠJV (s)
∂s2
=
2(1− β)
4a
− 2α < 0. (9)
If the firm adopts the export strategy, the profit of firm l is piEXl = R
EX∗
l =
1
9a
[b + cf − 2cl]2 − αs2. In this case, since the profit level is independent of
skill level s, the local partner does not achieve the skill at all in equilibrium.
Denote s¯ the intersection of the profit function piJVl and pi
EX
f for s > 0. Then,
we can calculate it using
s¯ = sˆ+
√
9(1− β)2(b− 2c0)2 + (4aα− (1− β))[9(1− β)(b− c0)2 − 4(b− 2cl + cf )2]
4aα− (1− β) .(10)
Since the profit for a skill level above this level satisfies ΠF < ΠE, it
is obvious that local partner does not invest in any skill level above s¯. To
analyze how the IJV and export strategies can arise, we assume that α is
not too high. In the first stage, firm l choose the skill level s∗ to maximize
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its payoff reflecting the choice of firm f . Thus, the payoff function switches
from piEXl to pi
JV
f at the cutoff s¯. To solve first stage game, we compare three
kinds of critical values: s˜, sˆ, and s¯.
We compare these values and show that four cases can arise in equilibrium
according to foreign ownership, β. Letting β1, β2, and β3 satisfy s˜ = s¯, sˆ = s˜,
and sˆ = s¯, we obtain the following proposition1.
Proposition 1 1. If 0 < β < β1, firm l does not invest and firm f exports
(Case 1).
2. If β1 < β < β2, the local partner invests to reach skill level s
∗ and the
firm adopts the IJV strategy (Case 2).
3. If β2 < β < β3, firm l invests to reach management skill level s˜ (which
is larger level than s∗) and firm f adopts the IJV strategy (Case 3).
4. If β3 < β < 1, firm f does not invest and chooses to export (Case 4).
Figure 1 illustrates the payoff of firm l in each case.
In case 1, firm f needs a high skill level to join an IJV strategy and firm
l has an incentive to invest in skill due to a high profit share. Then, firm
l cannot invest in a skill level above the cutoff level. In case 2, the cut off
level is decreasing as the profit share of firm f increases. Then, the IJV
strategy becomes an advantage and firm l invests at the cutoff level at which
firm f switches from an export strategy to an IJV strategy. When foreign
ownership is high enough in case 3, the cutoff point is low and firm l can
choose the investment level to maximize profit in the IJV case. However,
when the foreign ownership becomes too high, the local firm has a small
profit share, and the IJV strategy is always less profitable for firm l at any
investment level (case 4).
Next, we can obtain the realized payoff by substituting the equilibrium
investment level into the payoff in each case. We illustrate the realized payoffs
according to β in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows how foreign ownership affects each firms realized payoff.
For a low or high β (export case), the payoff outcome is the lowest level of all
cases. This result implies that a higher profit share does not bring a higher
payoff outcome and foreign ownership should be at a medium level for both
firms to gain a higher payoff.
1The Appendix provides the derivations for each point.
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Figure 1: The profit of firm l
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Figure 2: The profits of firms f and l
3.1 Investment subsidy from the foreign firm
Next, we consider an investment subsidy for the cost to overcome the ‘hold
up problem. We can derive the investment level that maximizes the total
profit of firms l and f as follows:
s∗∗ =
b− c0
4aα− 1 > sˆ
. We can describe the payoffs of both agents including the subsidy to invest
in skills as follows:
piJVf =
β
4a
(b− c(s))2 − φαs2
piJVl =
1− β
4a
(b− c(s))2 − (1− φ)αs2.
φ denotes the burden of the investment cost by the production firms. sˆφ
maximizes the above profit of firm l under a firm subsidy. Then, we obtain
sˆφ =
(1− β)(b− 2c0)
4aα(1− φ)− (1− β)]
. We can then derive γ = β to satisfy sˆφ = s
∗∗.
Proposition 2 The optimal share of the skill investment cost for firm f
corresponds to its foreign ownership level to achieve the social optimal in-
vestment level s∗∗.
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4 Discussion: Nash bargaining
In previous sections, we assumed that foreign ownership is exogenously given.
In this section, we consider the case where the profit share of the IJV project
is determined through Nash bargaining in the second stage. The Nash bar-
gaining solution is a vector of nonlinear contracts that maximize the Nash
products,
(βRJV −REXf )γ((1− β)RJV −REXl )1−γ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of firm f ’s bargaining power. We maximize this
expression with respect to β, yielding the following Nash bargaining solution,
β∗:
β∗ =
γ(RJV −REXl ) + (1− γ)REXf
RJV
. (11)
Next, we analyze whether a local production strategy is viable or not.
Comparing the profits of the IJV and export strategies, we can rewrite the
difference in profit as
Φ(s) ≡ piJVf − piEXf = γ(RJV −REXf −REXl )
Similar to Section 2, there exists a unique s˜γ that satisfies Φ(s) equal to
zero. This is the indifference point of profit between both strategy cases. We
can get
s˜γ =
2
3
X
1
2 − (b− c0) where X ≡ (b− 2cf + cl)2 + (b− 2cl + cf )2.
We go back to the first stage game to derive the optimal investment level
of firm l.
We can rewrite the payoff of the local partner as the following function
with respect to s:
piJVl (s) = (1− γ)(RJV −REXf ) + γREXl − αs2 (12)
We can obtain sˆγ, which maximizes the above function as
sˆγ =
(1− γ)(b− c0)
9aα− (1− γ) (13)
We show that the two cases arise in equilibrium according to the bargain-
ing power between agents. Letting γ¯ satisfy s¯ = sˆ, we reach the following
proposition.
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Figure 3: The profits of firms M and L
Proposition 3 1. If 0 < γ < γ¯, then the local partner invests to achieve
skill level sˆ and the firm adopts the IJV strategy.
2. If γ¯ < γ < 1, then the local partner does not invest and firm f exports
goods to the local market.
When the bargaining power of firm f is low, the profit share of firm l
is high. In this case, local firm l has an incentive to invest to attract firm
f . When the bargaining power of firm f become higher, however, an IJV
is always less profitable for firm l for any investment level. Hence, the joint
project case does not occur. We can see that cases 1 and 2 in the previous
sections disappear in the Nash bargaining setting. We calculate the realized
payoff of firm f and firm l in each case by substituting the equilibrium skill
level into their payoffs and illustrate the realized payoffs according to γ in
Figure 3.
Firm f receive a lager profit at a certain level of bargaining power. How-
ever, as it rises above the threshold level γ¯, the local firm does not invest. In
this case, the profit of firm f is at its lowest level.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the effect of foreign ownership on the overseas strategy of
a foreign firm and the strategic investment of local partner. To analyze
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this strategic relationship, we construct a 3-stage game in which a foreign
firm decides to implement an IJV strategy and local partner chooses its
skill level. In equilibrium, four cases arise according to the level of foreign
ownership. If foreign ownership is at a medium level, the local partner invests
in management skill and the barrier to the local production strategy becomes
lower. In this case, they can obtain a higher payoff. On the other hand, if it
is too low or too high, the foreign firm cannot extract skill investment from
the local partner, which turns out to yield the lowest payoff for both agents.
In this case, a local production strategy is too costly for the local firm and
the investment does not occur. We also show that the optimal subsidy for
the investment cost is proportional to the IJVs foreign ownership.
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Appendix
A Derivation for β1, β2, and β3
To compare s˜, sˆ. and s¯, let two functions with respect to β, f(β), and g(β),
respectively, satisfy
f(β) ≡ s˜− sˆ = β− 12 (9aα− 4(1− β))− 9aα( b− 2c0 + cf
b− 2Ch + Cf )(14)
g(β) ≡ s¯− sˆ =
√
9(1− β)2(b− 2c0)2 + (4aα− (1− β))[9(1− β)(b− c0)2 − 4(b− 2cl + cf )2]
4aα− (1− β) (15)
By assuming c0 < 2cf − cl, a quick calculation shows that the following
condition is satisfied,
f(0) = +∞
f(1) < 0
f ′(β)
{
< 0 (0 < β ≤ β˜)
> 0 (β˜ < β < 1)
Hence, we can show that there exists a unique β satisfying s˜ = sˆ around 0
to 1. We also calculate g(β) in a similar way.
g(0) =
3
√
a[α(b− 2c0 + Cf )2 − (9aα− 4(1− β))W˜ ]
9aα− 4 > 0
g′(β) < 0
Since we can see g′(β) < f ′(β) is satisfied at 0 < β < β2, there exists a unique
β1 satisfies f = g; that is, s˜ = s¯. Finally, we consider the third threshold
β at which g(β) = 0 is satisfied. Let its level be β3. It is possible that β2
is less than β3, which implies that the local production case may disappear
and the export strategy is chosen at any β. Hence, we see the case that all
investment patterns occur in equilibrium; that is, β2 < β3. This inequality
tends to occur when cl is larger.
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